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Abstract
I argue that, under the glitz, dual theories are examples of theoretically equivalent
descriptions of the same underlying physical content: I distinguish them from cases
of genuine underdetermination on the grounds that there is no real incompatibility
involved between the descriptions. The incompatibility is at the level of unphysical
structure. I argue that dual pairs are in fact very strongly analogous to gauge-
related solutions even for dual pairs that look the most radically distinct, such as
AdS/CFT.
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1 Same but Different
A duality is an equivalence relation between a pair of theories: a pair of theories
is said to be dual when they generate the same physics. 2 The existence of a
duality signals some freedom in the representation of the relevant physics
of the dual pair. However, according to the standard story, unlike ordinary
symmetries (including gauge symmetries), the representations connected by
dualities are often radically different in terms of their formulations and, if we
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1 I gratefully acknowledge generous funding from the FQXi and the Australian
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2 Where “same physics” is understood in terms of a matching of observables and
global symmetries (but not gauge-dependent variables and gauge symmetries).
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are literal in our reading of these formulations, also in terms of the ontological
pictures they paint. It is this marked formal/ontological difference combined
with qualitatively indistinguishable physics that make dualities special from
the point of view of philosophy of physics, also linking them to ongoing debates
in general philosophy of science. 3
As Yeminima Ben-Menahem has pointed out, whenever one has incompatible
descriptions of the world that are equally capable of describing, predicting, and
explaining phenomena one has a possibility that “constitutes a challenge to the
realist and comforts his opponent” (Ben-Menahem, 1990, p. 261). Structural
realism is often viewed as an adequate response to this challenge: be realist
about the structure that is (inevitably) shared by the descriptions at a level
deeper than where the incompatibilities lie. However, it might well be pos-
sible that this same ‘incompatible descriptions + observational equivalence’
problem reemerges at the deeper ‘structural’ level in which case a primary mo-
tivation for the structuralist programme is undermined. Steven French makes
no bones about it: “if the anti-realist can come up with examples of UTE where
there are no common (structural) parts beyond the empirical level, then the
structural realist will be scuppered” (French, 2011, p. 118). 4
Dualities at first sight appear to fit the bill: fully empirically equivalent but
underdetermined descriptions of the world that appear to diverge in their
deeper structural aspects. 5 After all, one has dualities holding between de-
scriptions with gravity (curved space) and without gravity (flat space); in four
dimensions and in ten dimensions (and so topologically inequivalent); at large
coupling strength and small coupling strength (a highly non-trivial difference
for all cases but g = 1); with spacetime of large radius and spacetime of small
radius (and so non-isometric as Riemannian manifolds); for electric (elemen-
tary states) and magnetic (solitonic states); with order (low temperature) and
with disorder (high temperature), and so on. Surely these are sufficiently struc-
turally orthogonal to scupper the structuralist ship? What is shared but the
observable content in these cases?
But this is too quick:
3 For example, according to Kevin Coffey’s recent ‘interpretation based’ (non-
formal) account of theoretical equivalence, dual theories would be clearly inequiva-
lent (Coffey, 2014). I will briefly return to this account below.
4 Structuralism is not one of my central concerns here: I’m concerned with how the
dual pairs are to be treated: as physically the same or physically different. However,
structuralist themes are never far from the surface given the nature of the subject
matter.
5 “[A]lternative hypothetical substructures that would surface in the same observ-
able ways” in Quine’s words (Quine, 1975, p. 313). To the best of my knowledge,
all authors that have considered dualities in the philosophical literature follow this
line: see, e.g. Gryb and The´bault (forthcoming).
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• Dualities are not quite cases of underdetermination, at least not in the sense
of the thesis of underdetermination of theory by data (logically incompat-
ible yet empirically equivalent theories). There is no competition between
dual descriptions, and the incompatibility can be transformed away in a
certain sense (not available in standard underdetermination scenarios) by
application of the duality group, as we shall see.
• Nor are dual descriptions along the lines of Glymour’s indistinguishable (yet
incompatible) spacetimes (Glymour, 1977), in which observational equiva-
lence is guaranteed by the fact that differences show up only behind causal
horizons inaccessible to observers so that no body of experimental or obser-
vational evidence could decide between competing hypotheses about certain
global features of such universes. 6 There are no structures hidden from our
gaze by the world’s causal structure in the case of dualities: the equivalence
applies to complete sets (‘totalities’) of observables (whether or not they
are measurable in practice). 7
In this article I argue that dualities are examples of equivalent descriptions
simpliciter (when supplemented with the duality mapping) and therefore we
should not be at all surprised when they generate equivalent physical content.
The apparent differences emerge from the freedom in assigning physical mean-
ings to the formulations. We should withhold realist, literal readings when a
duality exists since they are examples of ‘unphysical structure’ functioning
more or less in the same way that arbitrary coordinates and other gauges do.
Whenever a duality exists, I argue (by analogy with gauge freedom) that a
formulation’s natural interpretation should be taken as a mere representation
of a deeper underlying structure rather than a ‘fundamental’ representation of
the world. I claim that this procedure of finding a deeper structure eliminating
the representational freedom found in any dual pair is a general feature of
dualities. 8 As with gauge freedom, one can look upon dualities as vital clues
6 Holger Lyre has called these cases of “empirical limitations” (Lyre, 2009, p.237).
7 In fact, inasmuch as there is anything ‘hidden’ in one side of a dual description
(say because of the breakdown of a perturbative description at higher coupling),
the weakly coupled dual description uncovers it.
8 They are indeed, as Michael Atiyah has claimed, “two different points of view of
looking at the same object” (Atiyah, 2007, p. 69)—in this case the same physical
content. In general, the more perspectives one has, the more information one has.
But, again, this is quite unlike standard cases of underdetermination where know-
ing two incompatible descriptions does not provide more information about some
‘underlying structure.’ For example, having Poincare´’s ‘discworld’ theory (with its
distorting forces) and an infinite curved space theory (without such forces) does
not provide us with more information than either would alone. 9 The fact that the
descriptions are incompatible (rather than, say, complementary) means that discov-
eries in one do not apply to the other. Hence, it is the absence of incompatibility
that separates dualities from underdetermination (and, as seen here, convention-
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in uncovering (invariant) physical content without which one would have great
difficulty in understanding the underlying structure of whatever aspect of the
world one is trying to represent. Indeed, I think this is the proper way to
understand the existence of gauge symmetries and dualities: having expanded
mathematical (‘surplus’) structure leads to improvements in one’s knowledge
of the physics by providing different perspectives. Without the multiplication
in perspectives surplus structure brings, one is in a situation not unlike the
proverbial blind men and the elephant.
2 Different but Same
As Quine put it, “Scientists invent hypotheses that talk of things beyond the
reach of observation” (Quine, 1975, p. 313). That much is obvious. The thesis
of underdetermination of theory by data, so beloved of structural realists (since
it provides a key motivation through its natural resolution), builds on this
feature of science: since most working theories (certainly in physics) go beyond
actual (and indeed possible) observations, for any theory T we can ‘always’
find some competing theory T ∗ that matches T with respect to the observable
or observed content but differs elsewhere. More precisely, given some body of
observed empirical evidence Eobs we have it that ∀Eobs both T ` Eobs and
T ∗ ` Eobs despite the fact that, by assumption (or construction), T 6= T ∗.
Structural realists are able to slyly evade this problem since Eobs involves
(empirical) relational structure so that T and T ∗ will always wind up being
structural isomoprhs and so can be identified.
So goes the story. But the general thesis 10 has recently come under fire from
various directions. For example, (Earman, 1993) complains about the missing
‘genuine’ examples in science. Norton complains that all such cases show is
that T = T ∗, in the sense of being descriptive counterparts, for all genuine
that cases we do have, and so should not trouble even standard realists. More
recently (Lyre, 2009) has argued that there are in fact no interesting puzzling
cases of UTD in the mature sciences. He dismisses the cases discussed by
(Glymour, 1977) and (Malament, 1977), mentioned above, in which, as Lyre
nicely expresses it, “even idealized observers, observers who live forever, are
unable to determine the global topology of space” (Lyre, 2009, p. 238) on the
grounds that they are based on the empirical limitations mentioned above, set
by scales of various kinds.
alist moves) and, I will argue, means that dualities are in fact fully theoretically
equivalent.
10 In fact, I have in mind the weaker thesis in this paper, so that we needn’t assume
that such competing theories are always available, but only that some examples
exist.
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These claims are interesting and relevant, but my focus in this paper is on
whatever special features dualities might bring to the table. My view is that
in cases of dualities at least, Norton’s view is vindicated: we have T = T ∗
whenever T and T ∗ are dual. But then again, I don’t think T and T ∗ are
properly underdetermined whenever they are dual—T and T ∗ are dual but
not duelling descriptions! So this might be somewhat distinct from Norton’s
view.
There are some distinctions to be made concerning underdetermination, de-
pending on what content is underdetermined and by what. There are three
broad classes:
• Interpretive 11 underdetermination occurs when there is a multiplicity of in-
terpretations of one and the same formulation of a theory.
• Formulational underdetermination occurs when one and the same theory is
presented through different formulations (which might then have ontologies
of their own, which might or might not suffer from further interpretive
underdetermination).
• Theoretical underdetermination occurs when there are multiple distinct the-
ories compatible with the same body of evidence (usually assumed to be
complete evidence, or all possible evidence that might observed in princi-
ple).
If dualities are to fit into any of these pre-existing categories, it would be most
likely the ‘formulational underdetermination’ slot. Multiple formulations, in
suggesting distinct ontologies, will raise a problem for the realist on any di-
rect, literal reading of those formulations. However, as mentioned earlier, the
difference with this case is that dual formulations are not incompatible: they
are really the same. Why not use that same strategy whenever one meets for-
mulational underdetermination? Because one doesn’t have the kind of duality
mapping linking formulations in standard cases. However, there is another
kind of underdetermination that isn’t quite covered by this taxonomy, namely
that generated by gauge freedom. This is where dualities truly lie, though
whether there is underdetermination depends on whether one chooses to treat
the gauge freedom as physical, which runs strongly against the default. 12
11 Oliver Pooley (2006, p. 97) calls this “metaphysical underdetermination,” which
occurs when one formulation of a theory has many interpretations differing with re-
spect to their ontologies (say, an interpretation with and without spacetime points).
Coffey’s approach to theoretical equivalence appears to simply line up with this
kind of underdetermination: metaphysical underdetermination (when real) will be
understood as pointing to distinct theories (and so a different level of underdeter-
mination).
12 The default is that gauge-related scenarios are “different but same”: the difference
is only at the level of unphysical structure.
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It is important to bear in mind what is being claimed to be the same and what
is different. In all dualities, it is the theories that are equivalent, not what the
theories refer to. For example, in the case of T-dualities (and mirror dualities)
the equivalence holds between a string theory compactified on one space (e.g.
of a certain size and/or shape) and another (or the same) string theory on
another space. However, even though it is the theories that are identified
as equivalent, it clearly involves a certain kind of equivalence between the
spaces too: it tells us that from the point of view of the observables, certain
transformations of the space don’t matter (leaving the observables 13 invariant
and satisfying the same global symmetries). Thus, the theories are dual and
the mapping between the different spaces is a symmetry of the theory (given
the application of the other component of the duality switch, sending winding
to momentum modes and vice versa). This same principle holds for other
dualities. In AdS/CFT we claim that a pair of theories is equivalent (again
not what the theories refer to in a natural interpretation) and this tells us
something about the things that differ between the theories (in this case, the
dimensionality of space, the gauge symmetries, and the degrees of freedom). 14
But once again, we can say that from the point of view of the observables
and the physical symmetries, certain transformations ‘don’t matter.’ The only
difference between these transformations and standard gauge symmetries is
that they seem to relate things that look like they really should matter ! 15
13 To be clear, when I refer to ‘observables’ I am referring to genuine physical quan-
tities in the sense of gauge-independent variables.
14 This example is clearly far more complicated since it mixes ‘spacetime dualities’
(like those above) with non-spacetime dualities (namely ‘entity dualities’ relating
the basic degrees of freedom and ‘internal dualities’ relating gauge symmetries).
15 It is important to keep in mind the fact that the equivalence is at the level of the-
ories first and foremost: the symmetries hold, e.g., from the point of view of strings
propagating within the spacetimes. In other words, the physics of the strings is
insensitive to what we would ordinarily think of as physically significant transfor-
mations (switching manifolds of distinct shapes and sizes). However, the differences
would be physically significant from the perspective of point particles. In this case,
modal considerations alone would render distinct the two worlds-according-to-the-
descriptions. We must therefore remain purely in the realm of theoretical descrip-
tions to avoid such ‘external’ confounders. One might object to my claim that dual
pairs are theoretically equivalent on the grounds that it seems silly to think that
adding particles (to both theories) could render them inequivalent. However, I think
that since these are distinct theories, this is exactly what happens: in the context
of the string-only pair, there is equivalence. Indeed, if we consider the strings on
orbifolds (in which certain discrete symmetries are eliminated through identifica-
tions), then it becomes inconsistent to add point particles: orbifolds are not (always)
manifolds, which is fine for strings but not for particles. One can make precisely the
same point about the ‘line-point’ duality in projective geometry. Given that line and
point descriptions are isomorphic, switching ‘line’ and ‘point’ (e.g. in the ‘bumper
book of projective geometry theorems’) will not lead to falsehoods. But clearly not
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This is just the same principle as occurs in, say, general relativity with its
diffeomorphism invariance. Because it is a topologically invariant theory, the
observables don’t care about certain transformations. if one replaces the space-
time manifold with a topologically equivalent (i.e. differentiably homeomor-
phic) manifold, then the physics ‘stays the same.’ Since homeomorphic man-
ifolds do not alter the topological properties, the observable content of the
theory is unaltered under the action of a diffeomorphism. We don’t call this a
duality precisely because we treat the diffeomorphs as part of the same theory.
We can, if we like, give the points of the manifold (via coordinates) a ‘physical
interpretation’ (i.e. treat them as real spacetime points), but we know this is
to be taken with a pinch of salt: we choose our coordinate grids for utility. 16
We now know better than to treat the diffeomorphs as physically inequivalent
even though we could.
In the case of mirror duality that I discussed above, we have a relation involv-
ing topologically inequivalent manifolds, but again the physics is genuinely
identical: it is not a matter of limitation. There is no possible experiment that
could be made to distinguish M from M∗ using strings living in the space.
We could, again, view the two scenarios (strings on M and strings on M∗) as
physically distinct, or we could accept that it points to a redundancy just like
gauge freedom grounded in general relativity’s topological invariance. 17 This
everything is preserved by this duality: we are restricted to a certain kind of formal
discourse. As Robert Kirk argues (Kirk, 1986, p. 178), the theorems of projective
geometry are preserved under the switch only if we assume that the syntactic struc-
tures are left uninterpreted. Clearly if we perform the line-point switch in a sentence
like ‘you are looking at a line,’ then if it is true for one it will not be true for the
other: the duality symmetry is broken in such a case. One might also view along
these lines the possible breaking of the gauge interpretation of the vector potential
in classical electromagnetism by introducing quantum charges.
16 It has become customary to drop the term ‘symmetry’ in the case of gauge trans-
formations in favour of redundancy : symmetry is seen to be a misnomer here since
solutions are not mapped to distinct solutions but to the same solution. Redun-
dancy simply means ‘unphysical,’ and this refers to the fact that one can transform
the solution in a specific way without altering anything physical. Gauge transforma-
tions leave the physical content (the observables) invariant. But the terminology of
‘redundancy’ also is a misnomer in a certain sense. The transformations are not, of
course, redundant in the sense of utterly superfluous: they have a purpose after all.
While physically equivalent, different gauges can differ dramatically in how useful
they are in terms of modelling the physical situation. Some can be better suited to
some particular physical situation. Ditto dualities.
17 Nick Huggett (this volume) treats the intermediate case of T-duality in which
the manifolds are topologically equivalent but non-isometric. This is clearly much
closer to the general relativity example and submits far more readily to the same
kind of ‘gauge freedomesque’ treatment: spatial radius is a gauge degree of freedom
in the theory, and the ‘true’ degrees of freedom depend on the orbifold R/Z2 in
which the freedom is eliminated (essentially deleting a portion of the real line, from
7
is just an invariance at a different level, deeper than we are used to dealing
with, which makes it look like a more radical move to identify them physically.
Coordinates in general relativity do not have quite the same meaning as in
pre-GR theories. They can serve to label points, but not in a way that latch
onto ‘real’ features of spacetime points: there is a freedom (albeit with con-
straints) in how we label a spacetime’s points. Gauge is, of course, just a more
general way of speaking of coordinates in this sense. One can arbitrarily label
things other than bits of space, and in the same way these labels are often
devices set up with convenience in mind (and with some increase in overall
information about the system underlying the labelling). Sometimes a problem
will naturally ‘choose’ a specific labelling, thus fixing (selecting) a particular
gauge. Terence Tao 18 has a useful way of making sense of gauge fixing (or
gauge symmetry breaking) in terms of ‘spending’ a symmetry. Presumably
one could also ‘invest’ in a gauge symmetry by adding mathematical struc-
ture to a theory to make it more transparent or make tractable in some way.
Here is where I take the duality-gauge link to be particularly strong. One can
think of the ‘theories’ as frames of reference (like coordinates), appropriate
for particular situations. 19
Richard Healey adopts the stance that gauge symmetries constitute examples
of multiple realizability generated by surplus theoretical structure. As he says,
“[u]nderstood realistically, the theory is epistemologically defective, because
it postulates a theoretical structure that is not measurable even if the theory
is true” (Healey, 2006, p. 158). I argue that dual pairs have this same flavour:
in any situation in which one could be said to be measuring some observable
quantity of one of a dual pair, with equal justification one could apply the
the point of view of physical structure: string radius is not a physical observable).
The two theories are really representations (with unphysical structure) of a deeper
invariant structure. Indeed, it is well recognised that self-T-dual pairs are gauge
symmetries in the usual sense: I propose that this viewpoint should be generalised
to all dualities. However, as Huggett points out, one could view the duality as
leading to indeterminacy about the radius (no fact of the matter), which I take to
be analogous to the indeterministic bullet-biting response to the hole argument of
general relativity. One could. But the point I wish to make in this paper is that the
more complex duality cases are not in fact qualitatively different from the treatment
of gauge freedom in general relativity (and hole argument considerations): one has
the same set of interpretive options (as Huggett also mentions, this includes the
lesser-held ‘one true gauge (radius)’ option).
18 See “What is a gauge?”: http://terrytao.wordpress.com/2008/09/27/
what-is-a-gauge/.
19 Michael Redhead describes the process of ‘stretching’ (into reality) some surplus
structure by giving it a realistic interpretation (Redhead, 2003, pp. 128–9). I think
that the discussions of most dualities in physics thus far are guilty of unwarranted
stretching in just this sense.
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duality mapping and speak of measuring some other observable quantity. One
can measure neither: given the freedom, these would ipso facto be unobserv-
ables. However, to speak of this as an “epistemological defect’ misses the great
practical feature that both cases have: one can choose a gauge or dual picture
according to what is most useful (or practical, simple, etc.). 20
As Healey points out, the natural course of action is to treat the multiple
realizations (that is, the various descriptions linked by gauge symmetry) as
representations of one and the same physical situation. For example, one could
develop an electromagnetic potential’s value in many ways off an initial hy-
persurface, but without empirical difference, thus providing multiple realisa-
tions of the physical content. One cannot say the same for the loop integral
of the potential of course, and so it is often suggested that these invariant
objects provide the ‘true physical content’. Now, in the case of AdS/CFT du-
ality 21 , we know that in addition to the apparently significant differences that
there is important agreement. For example, the symmetries of the Yang-Mills
theory are identical with the isometries of the AdS5 × S5 geometry, namely
SO(4, 2) × SO(6). Hence my proposal that the differences be viewed as un-
physical in exactly the sense of gauge freedom: the duality mapping leaves
invariant all of the physically meaningful quantities and symmetries.
This general approach to dualities allows us to dissolve a potential problem 22
to the view that neither description is fundamental (since they are equivalent),
namely: the existence of applied dualities, in which, e.g. the gauge-gravity du-
ality is applied to a real-world manipulable system, such as condensed matter
systems. In such cases we simply know that we are not dealing with micro-
scopic black holes in higher dimensions, so it makes sense to think that the
description more closely corresponding to our knowledge of the system is, in
this case, the more fundamental. But ‘more fundamental’ here is read as more
applicable given the problem at hand. In other words, one might simply view
this as ‘spending the duality,’ so that the symmetry is broken.
Let’s finish off by linking the preceding discussion to more general issues of the-
oretical equivalence. Prima facie, dual descriptions appear to satisfy Quine’s
‘inter-translatability’ identity criterion of theories:
20 As Polchinski points out in his contribution to this issue, in the case of a strong-
weak duality, as coupling is increased what might have been a good approximation
for the first few terms in a perturbation series breaks down and can fail to reveal
qualitatively new physics that exists at some energy (confinement in QCD for exam-
ple). Investing in duality, like gauge symmetry, increases one’s grip on ‘the physics.’
Duals form an entangled pair in a very specific way. Having duals increases the
grasp one has of the ‘underlying physical content’—as Polchinski puts it, “having
an understanding of the two limits gives a powerful global picture of the physics”.
21 See the contributions of Polchinski and de Haro for the technical details.
22 My thanks to Radin Dardashti for drawing my attention to this problem.
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I propose to individuate theories thus: two formulations express the same
theory if they are empirically equivalent and there is a construal of pred-
icates that transforms one theory into a logical equivalent of the other.
(Quine, 1975, p. 320)
Quine’s criterion is intended to reduce the amount of underdetermination—
essentially by employing a Ramsey sentence framework. The price is a position
in which the theoretical ontology is left indeterminate. While I think Quine’s
criterion provides a useful analogy, there is something rather different in the
case of dual theories: it is not a case of the ontology being indeterminate
precisely because there is no incompatibility involved: there is convergence on
the same ontology though that is left unspecified to a certain extent—this is
the content of the phrase “dual but not duelling” above.
With dualities we have syntactic isomorphism plus observational equivalence,
yet the dual descriptions are nonetheless usually treated as distinct theories
since the syntactic structures, though isomorphic and generating equivalent
observable content, receive distinct physical interpretations. This is the claim
at least: one does not view the interpretation as merely a useful means (a
set of labels) for dealing with the syntax but as potentially describing reality:
as physical degrees of freedom. That is what I think we should deny. Doing
so has the potential to resolve various puzzles having to do with dualities.
However, I don’t view the situation as trivial as Norton’s expression: “the same
theory dressed in different clothes” suggests. ([2008], p. 33). What the dualities
reveal is that there are deep lessons to be learned about the identification of
unphysical degrees of freedom, in order to isolate the theory underlying the
dual pair.
Let’s return to Coffey’s interpetational view of theoretical equivalence to help
spell out this last remark. Coffey argues that certain ‘physical’ differences
are strong enough to stop the conclusion that what are commonly seen to
be equivalent formulations (e.g. Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of
Newtonian mechanics 23 ) are simple ‘notational variants.’ His position is stated
thus:
Two theoretical formulations are theoretically equivalent exactly if they say
the same thing about what the physical world is like, where that content goes
well beyond their observable or empirical claims. Theoretical equivalence is
a function of interpretation. It’s a relation between completely interpreted
formulations. (Coffey, 2014, pp. 834-5)
23 Nic Teh (this volume) considers this case, and puts pressure on the arguments
that suggest an inequivalence between such formulations (on account of the non-
existence of an isomorphism between the two descriptions): he argues that finding
an isomorphism is a work in progress rather than a settled matter.
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He unpacks this in the following terms, which closely relate to our presentation
of the issue facing dual pairs:
Insofar as we can understand the physical pictures provided by different
interpreted formalisms, and insofar as we’re capable of comparing those
pictures, we can straightforwardly determine whether two interpreted for-
mulations are theoretically equivalent, whether they say the same thing
about what the physical world is like. (ibid.)
Now, this looks like a sensible suggestion. We might easily transfer (as Doreen
Fraser seems to do, in fact, in this volume) the idea to dual pairs: they clearly
make very different physical claims on the surface. However, and this really
forms the backbone of my position, one must be careful with one one considers
to be physical structure in a representation (i.e. rather than surplus), as we
have seen. Gauge theories also look like they make physically distinct claims:
they can differ in which spacetime point does what, or in which vector potential
is realised, and so on. But the point is, we can choose not to admit these
differences as physically significant, and it is often a good idea not to do so.
So one always has an initial choice to make before Coffey’s analysis proceeds:
let’s work out just what is physical and unphysical, and then we can look and
see whether they say physically different things about the world. In the case
of dualities, however, there is no reason to assume that they are not just as in
the gauge theory case. 24
The claim that dual pairs are theoretically equivalent does not, then, amount
to the simple positivistic claim that empirical equivalence is all that matters.
There is a deeper argument going on here relaying on the duality mapping
holding dual pairs together in a way that standard underdetermination (and
conventionalist) scenarios do not. In the case of AdS/CFT one still has agree-
ment on the genuine symmetries (i.e. those that change the physical state in a
way that leaves the dynamics invariant). 25 As Polchinski puts it, the dualities
24 Curiously, Coffey mentions that Norton says something similar to the point I’m
making here, but he doesn’t follow up on it (cf. Coffey (2014, pp. 840)). The basic
idea of using dual pairs to identify unphysical structure (and physical structure!)
fits rather closely with James Weatherall’s approach to theoretical equivalence in
which one must look to an equivalence class of theories to decide what is physical in
any member (unpublished manuscript). The difference in my duality-specific claim,
however, is that the existence of such an equivalence class points to the existence
of a deeper theory characterised by the shared structure. It would be an interesting
project to explicitly apply Weatherall’s approach to dual pairs.
25 One must bear in mind that there are several highly unrealistic elements in play in
this example: crucially, being a conformal theory we find that the physical quantities
(masses and couplings) don’t ‘run with the energy scale’ used to measure them. We
should not be overly confident of our intuitions about what is physical and what is
unphysical here—note, of course, that ‘unphysical’ here does not mean ‘unrealistic.’
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are “blind to gauge invariances” but not to global symmetries since the latter
“act non-trivially on physical states”. The shared global symmetry group in
this case is PSU(2, 2|4) which means that physical quantities are left invariant
under this symmetry on both sides. This breaks down into a shared (bosonic)
subgroup of SO(4, 2) × SO(6), which corresponds precisely to the isometry
group of the string theory background (the product AdS5×S5) and the global
symmetries of the gauge theory (the product of the conformal group and the
symmetry group of six scalars). Hence, the group structure of the dual pair is
identical.
In their book on symmetries, Fuchs and Schweigert make the following insight-
ful remark about the relationship between dual theories and gauge symmetries:
In practice, there is frequently a natural notion of what one should consider
as a theory, so that any further analysis of the difference between these types
of symmetries [gauge versus duality] would be a rather academic exercise.
On the other hand, it can be a major breakthrough in science to discover a
symmetry between a priori different theories [a duality] and then promote
it to a symmetry of the first type [a gauge symmetry]. (Fuchs, 1997, p. 14)
I hold that this can be generalized to all cases in which one has a duality
symmetry: they can always be promoted to gauge-type symmetries because
they just are gauge-type symmetries.
To sum up what I take to be the take home message of this paper: when
we have (genuine) dualities apparently holding between a pair of theories, we
ought not to take either picture as fundamental or (entirely) physical. The
mere existence of a duality points to unphysical structure in the dual theo-
ries. Thus, any interpretation we give is ‘provisional,’ and points towards some
common core. This common core might be fully understood (as a deeper the-
oretical structure encompassing both dual theories) or might be known only
via the limited information provided by the dual pair. 26 I take this to be in
agreement with gauge freedom and the relationship of such freedom to the
gauge invariant structure it reveals: all dual pairs correspond to representa-
tions of a deeper structure. This is the lesson of taking the analogy with gauge
freedom seriously.
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